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Abstract
In a world with complete markets, the decision whether to rent or buy a
home is not influenced by risks related to human capital. If markets are in-
complete and have frictions, however, this may change. Renting should become
more likely the more mobile a household has to be and the more income risk
can be diversified. Using household panel data from Germany, we test both
predictions. We find that mobility requirements have a positive effect on the
probability of renting. This effect is robust even after controlling for state de-
pendence, unobserved heterogeneity and other factors known to influence the
tenure mode choice. Our data, however, does not support the hypothesis that
potential to diversify net income risk when renting affects the tenure mode
choice.
Keywords: Tenure mode choice, household mobility, background risk
JEL Classification: R21, G11, J24, C23, C25
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1 Introduction
Deciding whether to rent or own a home is a multifaceted and difficult choice. Early
studies on the tenure mode choice centered on the relative prices of renting and
owning (King, 1980; Rosen, 1979; Rosen and Rosen, 1980). Since then, many papers
have focused on the role of risk for the rent or buy decision. Rosen et al (1984),
for instance, found that the ratio of user cost volatility to rent volatility has a
positive effect on the decision to become a renter. More recent contributions to this
literature stress that it is not sufficient to consider the uncertainty of future housing
cost in isolation. The impact of user cost and rent volatility may be modified by
background risk that stems from household’s previous investment decisions. Of
particular importance is human capital, which is for most households the main
source for income creation. The requirements necessary to create this income and
the riskiness of the income itself may impact on the tenure mode choice.
In this paper, we analyze the importance of human capital for the tenure mode
choice of German households. Previous empirical studies concentrated on the US and
our paper provides comparative evidence from a market with a different institutional
setting. Different to markets in several other countries, the German rental market
is not exposed to rigid regulation and attractive for professional investors. This has
resulted in a large private rental market that offers dwellings of quality comparable
to those in the owner-occupied sector. The German housing market gives households
“a free choice between a self-occupied home and renting” (Voigtla¨nder, 2009, p. 360).
In addition to providing comparative empirical evidence, we make use of household
panel data, which allows us to refine some aspects of the empirical analysis.
The theoretical model of Ortalo-Magne´ and Rady (2002) motivates how risks
related to human capital can influence the tenure mode choice. The model shows in
particular that the mode choice does not depend on the risk of user cost and rents
per se, but on their correlation with labor income and also on the importance of
mobility requirements, both of which are related to human capital. Two conclusions
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can be drawn from the model.
First, renting a home instead of owning it exposes the household to future changes
of the rent. Owning a home effectively locks housing cost at a fixed level for the
period of stay and eliminates uncertainty over the future rent. This lock-in effect is
more valuable the longer a household expects to stay in a region. If a household has
to be mobile, on the other hand, renting shields from resale price risk and lowers the
transaction cost associated with a move. Even when a household expects to move
to a region where house prices are hit by the same shock, thus making resale risk
less important, transactions cost will remain substantial. A mobility effect may thus
arise for households in professions that require high job mobility, making renting
advantageous from a risk perspective.
Second, rent uncertainty is not necessarily detrimental if it is positively correlated
with the household’s labor market income. In this case, renting allows the household
to diversify some of its net income risk. Consider a region that is dominated by one
industry: If the industry is hit by a negative shock, the incomes of those working in
the industry will also experience a negative shock. This will lead to a decrease in
demand for housing services and regional rents. Renters benefit from this decrease,
while homeowners receive lower income, and suffer a decline in their housing wealth.
Hence a diversification effect may reduce the relative risk of renting for households
whose occupation is closely tied to the local economy.
Strong empirical evidence exists regarding the mobility effect, which has been the
main focus of the recent empirical literature. Henderson and Ioannides (1989), for
instance, use a reduced-form approach to estimate the indirect effect of variables that
can be linked with mobility requirements. They state that exogenous profession-
related opportunities “may necessitate residential moves”, but do not model this
explicitly. Boehm (1981), Boehm et al (1991), Kan (2000), and Haurin and Gill
(2002) provide evidence that mobility requirements increase the likelihood of renting.
The study of Haurin and Gill (2002) is of particular interest, because it uses data of
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households from a specific profession, military men, for which the length of stay is
nearly exogenous and does not have to be estimated. They find that the likelihood
of owning decreases with mobility requirements. Sinai and Souleles (2005) provide
empirical evidence for the US regarding the simultaneous effect of rent volatility and
mobility requirements on the likelihood of renting. The less volatile the rent and
the larger mobility requirements, the more likely is renting.
Less empirical evidence exists regarding the diversification effect. Davidoff (2006)
finds for US data that the covariance between house prices and labor income has
an effect at the intensive margin, so that households with income that is positively
correlated with house prices purchase smaller houses, but finds no statistically robust
effect of the diversification potential on the tenure mode choice itself.
Our study examines the empirical importance of the mobility and the diversifi-
cation effect for the tenure mode choices of German households. We thereby extend
the analysis beyond the US market and provide at the same time additional evi-
dence on the importance of the diversification effect. In addition, even though our
analysis is close to Davidoff (2006), we make methodological improvements by ana-
lyzing the mobility and the diversification effect together and by using the German
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) data set. The panel provides the necessary longi-
tudinal information for the construction of measures of mobility requirements and
the diversification potential of renting. Moreover, the panel allows us to examine
the effect of these measures on the probability of renting from two perspectives, a
sample of recently moved households as well as a larger sample of all households. Re-
cent movers are closest to actually choosing their tenure mode. They are, however,
also a quite specific, self-selected group of households. In the all-household sample,
the panel structure allows us to take into account both the sluggish adjustments of
tenure mode choice (state dependence) as well as the impact of unobservable but
correlated household attitudes and preferences (unobserved heterogeneity).
Our analysis consists of two parts. First, we construct our key explanatory vari-
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ables: measures of human capital related mobility requirements and diversification
potential. Mobility requirements are estimated from a survival analysis of house-
holds’ residence spells. The measure of the diversification potential of renting is built
on the observed correlation of profession-specific income growth and region-specific
rent growth series which we construct in a preparatory step. Then we proceed to es-
timate the impact of these measures on the probability of renting. For the sample of
recent movers, estimates are derived from a bivariate probit model that also consid-
ers the moving decision to account for selectivity. For the sample of all households,
estimates are obtained from a dynamic probit model of the renting probability that
accounts for unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence. We use both sets of
estimates to test for the existence of the mobility effect and the diversification effect
of human capital on tenure mode decisions.
A coherent set of results emerges from our analysis. The evidence on the ef-
fect of mobility requirements is statistically robust. Across all specifications and
samples, we find that the propensity of renting tends to increase with mobility re-
quirements, as theory predicts. The size of the estimated effect, however, varies
considerably: our estimates imply that a decrease of the expected time of stay by
six years (one standard deviation in our data) increases the probability of renting
between 2 and 10 percentage points. The level of this mobility effect is about 7
percentage points in our preferred specification. Regarding the diversification effect,
our measure of the correlation between profession income and regional rent series
show considerable potential for such an effect. Positive correlations exist for many
profession-region combinations, suggesting that the corresponding households could
reduce the volatility of consumption when renting. However, we do not find any
evidence for an impact of our measure of diversification potential on households’
propensity to rent.
Our findings are thus in line with previous findings: while career-induced mobility
requirements indeed favor renting there appears to be no noticeable diversification
effect. That we are able to confirm these findings is important for several reasons.
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First, we provide fresh evidence as our study comes from a previously unconsidered
market and, unlike previous articles, takes into account unobserved heterogeneity
among households. Second, our analysis provides ample opportunity for both effects
to come to the fore. Germany has a well-developed market for rental accommodation
where the rent-or-buy decision is not tilted in favor of owning by housing consump-
tion considerations. Moreover, we do not only consider a sample of all households
but also work with a sub-sample of recent movers who were actively confronted with
the tenure mode decision. Third, our result is not due to a failure of accounting
for unobservable, time-constant household characteristics that are likely to affect
this multifaceted decision. In our preferred specification, we control for unobserved
heterogeneity and state dependence in a correlated random effects model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides theoretical
motivation. Section 3 presents the data and explains the construction of the key
variables. Our estimation strategy is explained in Section 4. Section 5 presents the
empirical results. Section 6 concludes. Further details of the analysis are relegated
to the Appendix.
2 Theoretical motivation
Ortalo-Magne´ and Rady (2002) is the first theoretical paper to analyze the tenure
mode choice conditional on households’ human capital. From this perspective, the
tenure mode choice is made after the household head’s human capital has been ac-
quired early in life. Two issues follow: First, human capital will affect the tenure
mode choice through the mobility required for the profession. In particular, house-
holds in a high-mobility profession will find renting a more attractive option (mo-
bility effect). Second, the uncertain income from specialized human capital could
constitute a background risk, which cannot be hedged in other markets. Households
working in a profession closely linked with the local economy will receive labor in-
come that co-moves with the regional rent. In this case, renting helps to smooth
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non-housing consumption (diversification effect).
To present these aspects more formally, we use a discrete time utility maximiza-
tion framework. Dwellings are homogeneous and are supplied by absent risk neutral
agents, who are prepared to act as landlords or to sell the dwellings. The rent follows
Rr,t = R+ εr,t +
t−1∑
k=1
φkεr,t−k t > 1 , (1)
where r indicates the region, |φ| < 1, and εr,t is white noise, possibly contemporane-
ously correlated between the regions. The household makes the tenure mode choice
in period 0 and Rr,0 = R in all regions. The required return rate for a housing in-
vestment is i and the house price is P = R/i in period 0. A household’s professional
career lasts T periods; a profession-related move might be necessary in 1 < t′ 6 T .
The household’s expected utility is additive time-separable and period utility
depends on housing and a composite consumption good. The direct utility con-
tribution of housing is identical for renters and owners. The indirect contribution
of housing is via the net income that can be spent on the consumption good. We
assume that the household likes high expected net income, and dislikes risk, as mea-
sured by the variance of the household’s net income. Based on period 0 information,
the household chooses the tenure mode that provides the highest expected utility.
The net income is the gross income Yt minus cost of housing (rent or mortgage
payments). Assuming that a home purchase requires no down-payment and that the
household stays until T in the home, a renter’s net income is Yt−Rr,t for 1 6 t < T ;
an owner’s net income is Yt − iP for 1 6 t < T and YT − (1 + i)P + Pr,T for t = T .
The owner thus locks in housing cost at iP for all but the last period.
Conditional on period 0 information, the expected net income is E[Yt] − R in
all periods and is the same for a renter and an owner. The conditional variances,
however, are different. For a renter, the conditional variance is always
Var[Yt] + Var[Rr,t]− 2Cov[Yt, Rr,t] . (2)
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For an owner, the conditional variance is either Var[Yt] for 1 6 t < T or Var[YT ] +
Var[Pr,T ] + 2Cov[YT , Pr,T ] for t = T . Eq. 2 shows that if profession-specific in-
come and rent are positively correlated, then renting diversifies income risk, and the
strength of the correlation determines whether renting provides a smoother net in-
come in periods t < T than owning. The owner household is insulated from changing
rent in all but the last period. Using Eq. 1, owner’s net income variance for the last
period T becomes Var[YT ] + δ
2Var[Rr,T ] + 2δCov[YT , Rr,T ] with δ = φ(1 + i− φ)−1.
If the rental process has no memory, φ = 0, then δ = 0 and ownership insulates
the household from varying housing cost even in the last period. If rents have a
memory, φ 6= 0, then owners are exposed to part of the accumulated rent risk in the
last period. Ceteris paribus, it is therefore more likely that a household will rent if
the correlation between income and rent is high.
Some households might expect to move to another region in 1 6 t′ < T . Because
the household does not have to commit in period 0 to the tenure mode that will
be chosen in t′, the net income volatility if renting in t′ < t 6 T is not influenced
by the current tenure mode. Without a down-payment requirement, the same holds
if the household buys in the new region. The tenure mode choice in period 0 will
therefore depend solely on the net income volatility of renting and owning in the
current region.1 Most importantly, moving in t′ induces transaction cost. Buying
and selling homes have higher transactions cost than renting.2 A household that
has to be mobile will presumably want to avoid these additional cost and will prefer
to rent.
The framework leads therefore to two testable hypotheses: First, ceteris paribus,
a household is more likely to become a renter the shorter the expected period of
1If a down-payment is required, things become more complicated, because the volatility of future
direct housing cost will be influenced by the previous tenure mode. We ignore this aspect here and
in the empirical application.
2In addition to cost for employing the services of real estate agents and surveyors (which in
part is also incurred when renting), a purchase implies stamp duty and fees for legal transfer and
mortgage underwriting.
9
stay in the dwelling (‘mobility effect’). Although owning isolates the household
from rent volatility for the time of the stay, it also brings higher moving cost. This
transactions cost may more than outweigh the benefit of fixed direct housing cost.
Second, if renting diversifies part of the profession-specific income risk and smoothes
net income, i.e., Var[Yt − Rt] < Var[Yt], then a household should be more likely to
rent (‘diversification effect’).3
3 Data and key variables
Our main data source is the GSOEP, a representative panel survey of German house-
holds and their adult members.4 Further data comes from the Federal Statistical
Office, which provides a consumer price index and city population data. The price
index excludes housing services and has the year 2000 as base year. We use the index
to convert nominal variables into real figures. The population numbers are combined
with price data from the Ring Deutscher Makler (RDM) to compute regional house
prices.5
We focus our analysis on households that (i) have a household head that is of
working age (18 to 65 years), (ii) do not live in nursing and retirement homes, and
(iii) live in the area of the former West Germany, as the housing market in the East
is still in transition. Regarding the area, we focus our analysis on the 30 NUTS2
regions in the West of Germany.6 A NUTS2 region corresponds to a governmental
3The framework assumes stationary random variables. In the empirical analysis, we work corre-
spondingly with growth rates.
4The data were made available to us by the German Socio-Economic Panel Study at the German
Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin.
5The RDM is an association of real estate professionals that publishes annual surveys on house
prices in German cities. This information is based on inquiries among members and should indicate
prices reasonably. We compute regional prices by aggregating data from cities in the same region,
weighted with their population share.
6NUTS stands for the geocode standard Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics that has
been established by Eurostat to reference the administrative subdivisions of EU member countries.
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regional subdivision (Regierungsbezirk).
Our sample of all households defined above covers the years 1985 to 2004 and
has 52,413 observations on 5,785 individual households. In addition, we use data
from the 1984 survey wave to obtain lagged household information for 1985. We
extract two sub-samples from the full sample: (i) a pooled cross-section of 4,254
recent movers, that is households who have changed residence between two survey
waves, and (ii) an unbalanced panel with 36,625 observations on 3,364 individual
households. The sample size of the unbalanced household panel is smaller than
the full sample, because our panel analysis below requires that we observe each
household for at least two consecutive years, as well as the year 1984.
[Table 1 about here.]
Column (1) in Table 1 provides summary statistics on the socio-economic character-
istics of the households in the full sample. On average, 58 percent of the households
in the full sample are renting; the majority do so in the private sector. This figure
is in line with those reported by Kirchner (2007) for 1993.7 The share for the US
in the same year was 35 percent (Malpezzi, 1998, Table 1). In addition to different
size of the rental markets in the two countries, there are also differences in the legal
frameworks. Under German housing law, landlords and tenants can negotiate the
rent of new contracts freely. The landlord can adjust the rent later if the market
rent of comparable dwellings increases. Once agreed, the landlord can terminate the
contract only under specific circumstances, such as claiming the dwelling for own use
or arrears of rent, see Hubert (1998) and Tomann (1990). In the US, rents are free
in most cities, but regulated in some cities, lease agreements have a fixed term and
contract law varies between states. Whereas the legal framework in Germany is ho-
mogenous, it varies in the US between regions and cities. Finally, Germans seem to
7Kirchner (2007, Table 1) uses official statistics to calculate that 47.5% of all dwellings were in
the private rental sector, 10.9% in the social rental sector (together 58.4%), and 41.6% of dwellings
were owner-occupied. The sectoral shares for our full panel sample are in line with these numbers
and are not reported.
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place less value on the status of being a homeowner as such and—correspondingly—
do not see renting as a stigma. Regarding owner-occupation, the settings seem
similar. In both countries, imputed rents are untaxed. Mortgage interest payments
are non-deductible from taxable income under German tax law, homeowners receive
a subsidy on the purchase price instead.8
The socio-economic variables in Table 1 include demographic characteristics of
the household head, such as age, gender, marital status, nationality (German or
foreign), years of education, and household size. Economic characteristics include
an indicator for households who do not report financial asset holdings (besides saving
accounts), the ratio of average regional house price to yearly household income, and
yearly income from employment.
3.1 Human capital and professions
In the first step of our analysis we establish profession groups such that members
of a group have similar human capital. The sorting of households into these profes-
sions will be the basis for measuring profession-specific mobility requirements and
income volatility. Standard occupation groupings are not sufficient for this task,
because human capital has sizeable occupation- and industry-specific components
(Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009; Neal, 1995; Poletaev and Robinson, 2008). Hu-
man capital specificity is therefore the result of an individual’s occupation and the
industry the individual is working in.
The GSOEP reports for each employed person both the NACE Rev.1 industry
and the ISCO-88 occupation classification. We follow Shiller and Schneider (1998)
and perform a cluster analysis to establish stable profession groups. Our cluster
algorithm is based on the transition matrix between the industry-occupation group-
ings defined by 14 main NACE industries and 9 major ISCO-88 occupations. We
8Up to 1996 the subsidy was implemented through the tax code in form of accelerated deprecia-
tion rules for owner-occupied housing. From 1996-2004 homeowners received a direct payment that
was based on the purchase price (or construction cost) of the house.
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estimate the transition probabilities using data on all household heads and spouses
who have been in the GSOEP for at least two years during the period 1984 to 2004.
Appendix A.1 gives details on the cluster analysis.
[Table 2 about here.]
We obtain 14 professions that are characterized by high transition probabilities
within and low transition probabilities between them, see Table A1 in Appendix
A.1.9 Table 2 describes the resulting profession groups, along with short names that
characterize the professions. The allocation of industries and occupations to the
14 professions largely follows intuition. For instance, professions in the health or
financial industry comprise almost all ISCO-88 occupations (Occupations in Health
and Social Work and Occupations in Financial Industry). Craftsmen, on the other
hand, form their own profession regardless of the industry (Manual and Production
Services). The sorting of households into these 14 professions is the basis for com-
puting our two key explanatory variables, profession-specific mobility requirements
and the relative risk of renting.
3.2 Mobility requirement
We measure the mobility requirements given the household head’s profession by
estimating a parametric model of residence duration. We fit the model using the
information of residence spells of households in the GSOEP. With the fitted model,
we then predict the expected remaining time of stay given that the household has
spent already a period of time τ in the current residence. Aside from the profession
of the household head and τ , we also consider the effect of household characteristics
on the expected remaining time of stay.
9In principle, a more finely graded grouping would be desirable to reduce bias when constructing
our mobility and income measures. This, however, is precluded by the sample size of the GSOEP,
particularly since we subsequently combine the professions with the regions to compute the diver-
sification potential that a member of a profession may exploit when renting its accommodation.
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Let T ≥ 0 be a continuous random variable which represents household residence
stay, which is the elapsed time since a household last moved. T is characterized by
a parametric distribution function F (τ) = P (T ≤ τ). Using the survival function
S(τ) = 1−F (τ) and the density f(τ), the expected remaining residence stay m(τ) ≡
E[T − τ |T > τ ] is
m(τ) =
1
S(τ)
∫ ∞
τ
(u− τ)f(u)du . (3)
Closed-form solutions for the integral on the right hand side of Eq. 3 exist for a
number of well-known distributions (Lai and Xie, 2006, Ch. 4).
We assume that residence spells follow a lognormal distribution with possibly
time-varying household covariates x(τ), which implies that ln(τ) ∼ N(x(τ) β, σ2).10
It follows for Eq. 3
m (τ) =

exp
{
x(τ)β + 0.5σ2
}
if τ = 0
1− Φ
(
ln(τ)− x(τ)β − σ2
σ
)
1− Φ
(
ln(τ)− x(τ)β
σ
) exp{x(τ)β + 0.5σ2}− τ if τ > 0

, (4)
where Φ(·) denotes the standard normal distribution function. By assumption, m(τ)
decreases initially and then increases monotonically with the elapsed time. Given
estimates of β and σ, we can use Eq. 4 to impute the expected remaining time of stay
given τ and the characteristics of the household. We denote the estimated expected
time for a household mh and call the variable ‘mobility requirement’.
11 The smaller
mh is, the more mobile we expect household h needs to be.
[Table 3 about here.]
To estimate β and σ and ultimately mh, we run Tobit-type regressions using a
flow sample of households’ residence spells. Since our expected duration variable mh
10We tried other parametric distributions, such as the exponential, log-logistic, and Weibull. The
lognormal provided the best fit to the data.
11We suppress the dependence of mh on τ in what follows.
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should reflect job-related mobility requirements, we would ideally focus on moves
between housing market areas, i.e., moves due to job-related reasons, and exclude
moves within housing market areas, i.e., moves due to consumption needs for hous-
ing. The GSOEP provides us only with the regional NUTS2 classification, which is
based on administrative areas. These areas do not necessarily coincide with housing
market areas, which are difficult to establish. We therefore use all residence spells
and control for other moving motives by including a rich set of explanatory vari-
ables. In particular, we regress the log of observed residence durations on a vector
of household variables, such as household head’s gender and age, and on marital
status and household size. We also include a full set of profession dummies and an
indicator for the household head’s employment status in x(τ) to capture profession-
specific mobility differentials. Further details on the regression model and data are
given in Appendix A.2.
Table 3 reports maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of the coefficients. The de-
mographic controls are statistically significant and have the expected signs. House-
hold mobility, for instance, decreases with household size and increases for house-
holds with unemployed heads. The estimated coefficients for the profession dummies
are statistically significant in most cases. Moreover, the Wald test in Table 3 re-
jects the joint null hypothesis that all profession group coefficients are zero at the 5
percent level.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 1 shows the estimated survival function for the least mobile profession (Pro-
fession 4: All occupations in Natural Resource Industry) and the most mobile profes-
sion (Profession 13: All occupations in Hotel, Restaurants Industry). In both cases,
the function declines rather slowly, indicating that household mobility is small over-
all. Members of Profession 4, however, always have a lower probability of moving
(conditional on already staying for time τ) than members of Profession 13. The esti-
mated median duration of both professions at average characteristics varies between
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5 and 7 years, see the dashed reference line at S(τ) = 0.5. Summary statistics of
the mobility variable for the different samples are given in Table 1.
3.3 Diversification potential of renting
We compute 14 profession-specific income series and 30 NUTS2 region-specific rent
series. Both constant-quality series are estimated from hedonic repeat-measures
regressions that control for observed and unobserved characteristics of workers and
dwellings, respectively (Shiller, 1993; Shiller and Schneider, 1998).12 We use these se-
ries to construct a measure of diversification potential for each of the 420 profession-
region combinations.
We estimate the profession income series using the GSOEP data of individuals’
employment income as the dependent variable. Including a set of time dummies
for each profession allows us to construct constant-quality income index series. We
convert these index series into levels by using the median profession income in each
region for the year 1995, thus allowing for region-specific income level effects.13 The
final income series are computed as weighted averages of the income received if
employed and the benefit received if unemployed. Unemployment replacement rates
are provided by the OECD; the weights are based on the actual unemployment rates
of GSOEP members. We estimate the rent series using the GSOEP data on dwelling
rents as the dependent variable. Including a set of time dummies for each region
allows us to construct constant-quality rent index series. We convert the series into
levels by using the median rent for each region in the year 1995. Appendices A.3
and A.4 provide details on the computation of the constant-quality income and rent
series.
12In our panel data application, we use the fixed effects rather than the traditional repeat-sales
estimator, because diagnostics of the estimated residuals indicate that the former will be more
efficient.
13The income movement of a certain profession may also depend on region-specific factors. There-
fore, one would ideally like to estimate constant-quality income indices for each of the 420 profession-
region groups. Due to sparsity of observations, we do not estimate such indices.
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[Table 4 about here.]
Table 4 presents summary statistics of real income and rent growth rates for the
professions and regions over the sample period and for the base year 1995. Between
1984 and 2004, the average (across and within regions) standard deviation of real
rent growth rates was about 3.9 percent per year. For the same time period the
average (across and within professions) standard deviation of real income growth
rates was about 3.4 percent.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Not only do real rent growth rates vary among regions and real income growth rates
vary across professions, they are also correlated. Figure 2 presents box plots, each
box showing how income-rent covariances vary among the 30 regions for a given
profession. Positive covariances correspond to the portions of the box plots right
from the zero line. Several professions experience substantial positive or negative
correlation of their income with the rent, depending on the region of residence. To
illustrate, Managers, Professionals and Clerks are exposed to little variation over
the 30 regions. The opposite is true for Occupations in Agriculture Sector.
The framework presented in Section 2 implied that a household’s risk calculus will
be tipped in favor of renting if the net income volatility is smaller when renting than
when owning. Therefore, a volatile rent will be beneficial if it counteracts undesired
variation in profession income and detrimental if it enforces such variation. To take
this into account, we construct a measure of relative net income risk. We start by
using the region-specific rent and the profession-specific income series and compute
the real growth rate of net income. For renting, this rate is
∆Y Rentpr,t =
(Ypr,t −Rr,t)− (Ypr,t−1 −Rr,t−1)
(Ypr,t−1 −Rr,t−1) , (5)
where Ypr,t is the real income level for profession p in region r and year t and Rr,t is
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the real rent in region r and year t. For owning, the rate is
∆Y Ownpr,t =
(Ypr,t −Rr)− (Ypr,t−1 −Rr)
(Ypr,t−1 −Rr) , (6)
where Rr is the corresponding within-region time average of the rent.
14 The impli-
cation of Eqs. 5 and 6 is that, on average, owning and renting have the same cost,
but their riskiness will differ. We measure the relative net income risk with
dpr =
∑2004
t=1985
(
∆Y Ownpr,t −∆Y Ownpr
)2∑2004
t=1985
(
∆Y Rentpr,t −∆Y Rentpr
)2 . (7)
We call this measure ‘diversification potential’. If dpr = 1, the net income volatility
with locked-in user cost is exactly the same as the net income volatility if renting.
If dpr > 1, renting seems more attractive from a risk perspective. Finally, dpr < 1
implies that there is no diversification potential in the local rent variation for a
household of a given profession.
[Figure 3 about here.]
The scatter plot in Figure 3 shows the relationship between dpr and the income-
rent covariance. Because dpr is based on net income growth rates, the association is
expectedly close, but not perfect. Most points fall into the north-east and the south-
west quadrants defined by the dashed reference lines at dpr = 1 and a covariance of
zero. As expected, positive covariances tend to produce dpr > 1, while values of dpr
below one tend to be associated with negative covariances. Summary statistics for
dpr for the three different samples are given in Table 1.
The measure dpr has two potential limitations. First, more than one house-
hold member may earn income, resulting in opportunities for intra-household risk
14It is not possible to compute the user cost at the household level and hence at the profession
group level, because important information on mortgage financing and tax treatment is not recorded
in the GSOEP. The regional real user cost Rr is then for the average household; in the empirical
applications we control for the tax treatment (by using employment income as a regressor) and for
changes in interest and tax rates by using time dummies.
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sharing. We consider such intra-household risk sharing in our empirical specifica-
tions below and replace Ypr,t in Eqs. 5 and 6 for double-income households with
Yh,t = 0.5
{
Yp(H)r,t + Yp(S)r,t
}
. The subscripts h denote the household, and p(H)
and p(S) denote the profession of the household head and the spouse, respectively.
The resulting series of net income growth, ∆Y jh,t, j ∈ {Rent,Own}, and measure
of the diversification potential thus depend on the professions of both household’s
head and spouse. Second, dpr focusses exclusively on professional income, ignoring
that households may have other sources of income, such as income from financial
assets. The GSOEP records if a household has financial assets, but does not provide
information on income from the assets.15
4 Estimation methodology
We present two sets of estimates of a household’s conditional probability of renting:
(i) a bivariate probit regression from the sample of households that moved recently,
and (ii) a dynamic panel probit regression using the unbalanced household panel. We
are mainly interested in the partial effects of the measure of mobility requirements,
mh,t, and the measure of diversification potential of renting, dh,t.
16 We expect mh,t
to have a negative and dh,t a positive effect, because a larger mh,t corresponds to
smaller mobility requirements and a larger dh,t to a higher potential of net income
risk diversification. For each regression, we estimate two specifications by adding
successively more control variables. The additional variables are those that have
been found in other studies to affect the tenure mode choice.
15Because the market value of the assets is not reported either, it is not possible to infer income
indirectly.
16The diversification potential measure dh,t has a household index, as it can depend on both the
household head’s and the spouse’s profession. The measure does not vary across households living
in the same region and members working in the same profession.
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4.1 Bivariate probit model for recent movers
We first estimate the relationship between the probability to rent and our diversifi-
cation and mobility measures using the sample of recent movers. These households
faced the tenure mode decision recently, making them highly relevant for testing the
implications of the model presented in Section 2 (Ihlanfeldt, 1981). At the same
time, recent movers are a self-selected group that may differ from the population of
all households in ways that could affect their tenure mode choice. As some relevant
household characteristics are unobserved in our data, standard estimation methods
may give biased results (Boehm et al, 1991; Kan, 2000; Painter et al, 2001).
To draw inference in the population at large, we control for selection on unob-
servables by employing the bivariate probit model for censored data (Van de Ven
and Van Praag, 1981). In particular, we model the tenure mode choice and the
moving decision with
y1,h,t = 1 [β0,1 + β1mh,t + β2dh,t + x1,h,tδ1 + ε1,h,t > 0] (8)
y2,h,t = 1 [β0,2 + x2,h,tδ2 + ε2,h,t > 0] , (9)
where 1 [·] is the indicator function. Eq. 8 models the tenure mode choice: y1,h,t is
one if household h chooses to rent; otherwise it is zero. Because we observe an active
tenure mode choice only when a household moves, the sample for this equation is
censored. Eq. 9 models the moving decision: y2,h,t is one if the household moved
between the previous and current survey waves; otherwise it is zero. The sample
for this equation is uncensored. Assuming that ε1,h,t and ε2,h,t are independent of
the regressors in both equations and that they follow a standard bivariate normal
distribution with correlation ρ, we estimate the coefficients with ML. The estimates
are then used to compute partial effects of the explanatory variables, where we
evaluate the partial effects at the averages of the exogenous variables in the all
household sample.
Apart from our two key explanatory variables in Eq. 8, the vector x1,h,t considers
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additional variables that could affect the tenure mode choice. In our most extensive
specification, this vector consists of socio-economic variables and a full set of time
and region dummies. By including these additional regressors, we aim to control
for other influences on the tenure mode choice that have received attention in the
literature, such as the effects of credit constraints and differential tax treatment of
owner-occupied and rental housing. Regarding credit constraints, we employ two
variables: the ratio of regional house prices to yearly household income (‘Price-
income ratio’) and an indicator variable for households with no financial assets (‘No
assets’). Households with high values of the former variable and/or no financial asset
holdings may have insufficient financial resources for a down-payment. Regarding
tax treatment, owner occupation brings the benefit that the imputed rent is not
taxed. The value of this benefit is the higher the higher household’s marginal tax
rate. We therefore include household head’s employment income as a proxy for this
potential benefit.17
The vector x2,h,t of regressors in Eq. 9 considers the same socio-economic control
variables that are also in x1,h,t. But x2,h,t also contains profession dummies, which
should capture profession-specific mobility differentials, as well as changes of house-
hold variables between survey waves, such a household size and composition, marital
status, and labor force status. The profession dummmies and change variables are
exclusive to x2,h,t and are crucial for the identification of the selection coefficient
ρ.18
The bivariate probit regression in Eqs. 8 and 9 is a natural starting point for the
analysis, as it considers households who have made an active tenure mode decision.
The regression, however, ignores unobserved variables that may influence the tenure
mode choice, such as an inherent preference for either tenure mode or household-
17The simultaneous inclusion of the two credit constraint variables makes it plausible that the
income variable controls primarily for the tax advantage of ownership.
18Without exclusion restrictions the coefficients are only weakly identified due to the nonlinearities
of the probit model.
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specific attitudes towards risk. If these unobserved variables are not independent
from the regressors in Eq. 8, the estimated partial effects are generally biased. An
independence assumption, however, is not very plausible. For instance, there is
ample empirical evidence that risk attitudes vary with demographic characteristics,
which affects the choices households make (Barsky et al, 1997; Dohmen et al, 2005).
4.2 Dynamic panel probit model for all households
The second regression at the household level aims to address the potential shortcom-
ing of the analysis based on recent movers. Using the unbalanced household panel
allows us to estimate the conditional probability of renting with a dynamic random
effects probit regression
P (yh,t = 1|yh,t−1, . . . , yh,0,mh,dh,xh, ch) =
Φ
(
β0 + β1mh,t + β2dh,t + γ1yh,t−1 + xh,tδ + ch
)
. (10)
The variable yh,t is one if household h is renting in period t; otherwise the variable
is zero. The probability of renting can depend, in principle, on the entire path of all
panel waves of past renting decisions (yh,t−1, . . . , yh,0), past values of the observed
explanatory variables (collected in the vectors dh, mh, and xh), and a household-
specific random effect ch. The right hand side of Eq. 10 shows how the dynamic
probit regression specifies the probability. As we will see below, ch can depend on the
explanatory variables too. In addition to the variables used above, the probability
of renting depends on yh,t−1, the tenure mode in the year previous to t. Allowing for
state dependence is important, because the adjustment of tenure modes in the gen-
eral population is typically sluggish.19 The household-specific effect ch acknowledges
that the tenure mode choice may be influenced by unobserved heterogeneity.
19Previous tenure mode status may affect current choices for several reasons. For instance, high
search cost of selling and buying a home may lock homeowners in. Previous tenure mode may also
be an indicator for a household’s financial wealth and thus the ability to afford a home.
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Estimates from Eq. 10 for the effects of our key explanatory variables, mh,t and
dh,t, will be particularly appealing, because they apply to the tenure mode choice of
all households and also allow these choices to be affected by state dependence and
unobserved heterogeneity. The estimation of the regression in Eq. 10, however, faces
two problems. The first is the relationship between ch and the observed explanatory
variables, which needs to take into account that the unobserved effect is likely to be
correlated with socio-economic characteristics. The second is the initial condition
problem, which implies that the observed initial tenure mode choice, yh,0, depends
most likely on the unobserved effect ch too (Heckman, 1981).
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We account for both problems by using the correlated random effects approach,
which models the distribution of ch given the initial observation and the path of ex-
planatory variables (Chamberlain, 1980; Mundlak, 1978; Wooldridge, 2005). Specif-
ically, we assume
ch = α0 + α1yh,0 + α2mh + α3dh + xhα4 + ah , (11)
which means that the unobserved effect ch depends on the first observed tenure
mode, yh,0, the averages of the explanatory variables over time, and an unobserved
random component, ah. The random component is normally distributed in the
population with mean zero and variance σ2a > 0. Combining Eqs. 10 and 11 gives
the correlated random effects regression for the probability of renting
P (yh,t = 1|yh,t−1, . . . , yh,0,mh,dh,xh, ch) = Φ
(
γ0 + β1mh,t + β2dh,t
+ γ1yh,t−1 + xh,tδ + α1yh,0 + α2mh + α3dh + xhα4 + ah
) (12)
with γ0 ≡ β0 + α0. The joint density of tenure mode choices yh,1, . . . , yh,T , inte-
grated over the density of ah, has the same structure as the conditional likelihood of
the random effects probit model. The coefficients can therefore be estimated with
conditional ML.
20An independence assumption is only plausible if all observations for a household start with the
beginning of its formation and are independent of the regressors in Eq. 10.
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Once the coefficients of the regression are estimated, we use
N−1
N∑
h=1
Φ
(
γ̂a0 + β̂a1m+ β̂a2d+ γ̂a1y + xδ̂a
+ α̂a1yh0 + α̂a2mh + α̂a3dh + xhα̂a4
) (13)
to compute average partial effects (Wooldridge, 2005). The coefficients in Eq. 13 are
the estimated coefficients of Eq. 12, divided by
√
1 + σˆ2a, where σˆ
2
a is the estimated
variance of ah. Eq. 13 is evaluated at d, m, x, and y, which are the averages of the
explanatory variables in the unbalanced panel of all households, see column (3) of
Table 1. N is the number of observations in the sample. By summing over yh0, dh,
mh, and xh, which are the explanatory variables determining ch according to Eq. 11,
the influence of the household-specific random errors ah cancel each other out. The
partial effects computed with Eq. 13 are therefore for the average household in the
all household sample.
Using Eq. 13 gives average partial effects that account for unobserved hetero-
geneity and state dependence in the tenure mode choice. The estimated effects allow
the unobservable effect, ch, to be correlated with the time averages of the observa-
tions on the explanatory variables. However, this also implies that the correlation of
(nearly) time-constant variables with ch and their effect on the probability of rent-
ing cannot be identified separately. We therefore also estimate—to obtain reference
estimates—the coefficients in Eq. 10 by pooled probit. If unobserved effects play no
role for households’ tenure mode choices, then partial effects estimated with pooled
probit will be consistent.
4.3 Identification strategy
Before we proceed to the empirical results, we briefly summarize our strategy to
identify the effects of our key explanatory variables, the mobility requirement mea-
sure mh,t and the diversification potential measure dh,t. First, we account for the
complexity of tenure mode decisions by controlling for a range of other factors in our
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tenure mode equations. For transparency, we add these additional explanatory vari-
ables successively to both tenure mode models. Second, we provide for the specific
features of our two estimation samples. In the sample of recent movers, the tenure
mode equation is complemented by a selection equation in our bivariate probit re-
gression to control self-selection effects in this group of households. In the panel
of all households, we account for the potential state dependence of current tenure
mode by including lagged tenure mode. Moreover, we exploit the panel structure
of our data to control for the effects of unobserved household-specific attitudes and
preferences that favor a specific tenure mode. Third, we aid identification of the mo-
bility effect by imposing exclusion restrictions on the tenure mode models. They do
not include the job-related explanatory variables (profession dummies, employment
status). These variables are exclusively used in the duration regression as ‘mobility
shifters’. This is important as the duration regression, apart from the job-related
regressors, also uses a full set of socio-economic explanatory variables to account
for mobility not driven by job issues. By excluding the ‘mobility shifters’ from our
tenure mode regressions, we ensure that the estimated effect of mt,h on tenure mode
can be attributed properly to variation of the job-related variables (as well as τ).
This provides identification leverage and lends credibility to our interpretation of
the effect of mh,t as stemming from job-related mobility requirements.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Estimates for recent movers
Table 1 provides in column (2) summary statistics for the sample of 4,254 recent
movers. Recent movers are different from the general population, as represented
by the full sample summarized in column (1). The socio-economic characteristics
suggest that recent movers are in the early stage of their life-cycle. On average,
they are younger, earn less income, have accumulated less assets, live in smaller
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households, and comprise less families with less children. Moreover, a recent mover
is also more likely to be a renter.
We use the bivariate probit regression of Eqs. 8 and 9 to analyze the tenure
mode choice of recent movers. The coefficients of this model are estimated with ML.
Partial effects for the tenure choice equation are computed at the sample averages
of the explanatory variables for the full sample, see column (1) of Table 1.
[Table 5 about here.]
Table 5 reports the estimation results. Standard errors are computed with the
bootstrap, because mh,t and dh,t are generated regressors (Efron and Tibshirani,
1993).21 We present two specifications of the tenure choice equation. In Specification
1, only our key explanatory variables and a set of time dummies and region dummies
are included. In Specification 2, additional socio-economic variables are added. The
selection equation contains the same set of regressors in both specifications.
Before examining the estimated partial effects of the tenure choice equation,
we discuss the results for the moving decision. The magnitude of the estimated
coefficients of Eq. 9 are very similar in both specifications. Moreover, most of the
coefficients are statistically significant and have reasonable signs. Household size
and age, for instance, have a negative effect on the propensity to move. Changes in
the composition of the household, marital status, and labor force participation, on
the other hand, increase the likelihood of changing residence. In both specifications,
a likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that the correlation, ρ, is zero at the
usual significance levels.22 Estimating Eq. 8 independently will therefore give biased
estimates for the population coefficients when using the sample of recent movers.
21We obtain bootstrap standard errors that take into account clustering of the observations over
individual households. For each cluster, we resample from the original set until the new set has
as many clusters as the original set. We repeat this procedure 200 times. For each full sample
replication, we estimate, both, coefficients and partial effects and use the standard deviations across
the replications as bootstrap standard errors.
22The estimated correlation between the error terms is negative. A priori one would expect that
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Turning to the tenure mode choice equation, the effect of an increase of house-
hold’s mobility requirement—which corresponds to a decrease of mh,t—on the prob-
ability of renting is positive and statistically significant at the usual levels in Specifi-
cation 1. In Specification 2 the p-value of the null hypothesis that the partial effect
equals zero is 0.159. Considering the estimated partial effect in Specification 1, a
decrease of the expected time of stay by six years (i.e. a decrease by one standard
deviation) yields an increase of the probability of renting by 6 percentage points.
There is, however, a very pronounced drop in the estimated magnitude of this effect
in Specification 2. In particular, the point estimate of the partial effect is reduced
to a level of 2 percentage points for the same decrease of the expected time of stay.
This drop is attributable to the inclusion of variables that are directly linked to mh,t,
such as profession or household size. This leaves little independent variation left in
mh,t for the sample of recent movers.
23 Identification of the mobility effect is thus
severely hindered in Specification 2.
Regarding the other key explanatory variable, the likelihood of renting should
be higher for households in profession-region cells where the regional rent volatility
offers the potential to diversify some of the net income variation. Yet, in both
specifications the estimated partial effects of the diversification potential dhr,t is
indistinguishable from zero. Our data for recent movers does not support the notion
that households exploit the diversification potential of renting when making their
tenure mode choice.
The estimated partial effects of the control variables in Specifications 2 in Table
5 have plausible signs and magnitudes. In particular, the variables that proxy the
presence of credit constraints (‘Price-income ratio’ and ‘No assets’) and the differ-
ential tax treatment of owner-occupied and rental housing (‘Employment income’)
unobserved factors which increase households’ mobility should also increase their likelihood to rent.
However, one must bear in mind that Eqs. 8 and 9 are reduced-form equations which makes any
interpretation of the estimated correlations difficult.
23For recent movers, mh,t is almost always evaluated at τ = 0. As some households are not
always interviewed in the same months, residence spells for recent movers can be greater than zero.
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have the expected signs and are statistically significant. Credit constraints increase
while tax benefits for higher income households decrease the probability to rent.
Notably, socio-demographic characteristics that can be linked to mh,t, such as ‘Age’
and ‘Children’ have no statistically significant effect on the tenure mode choice. This
confirms the findings in Boehm (1981), Henderson and Ioannides (1989), and Kan
(2000) that these variables mainly proxy households’ mobility requirements.
In summary, the evidence in Table 5 points to a positive mobility effect. House-
holds with higher profession-specific mobility demands have a greater likelihood to
rent their accommodation, even after including a full set of controls. The positive
diversification effect suggested by the recent literature is not found in our sample of
recent movers.
5.2 Estimates for all households
We now turn to the analysis of the tenure mode choice using the unbalanced house-
hold panel. Summary statistics for this sample are reported in column (3) in Table
1. Compared to the general population (as summarized by the full sample in column
(1) in Table 1) households in the unbalanced panel are quite similar with respect
to most of their socioeconomic characteristics. Due to panel attrition of more mo-
bile households, households in the unbalanced panel are, on average, older and have
longer expected remaining stays. Moreover, they are more likely to own their home.
We estimate the dynamic probit model of Eq. 10, both, as a pooled probit re-
gression and as correlated random effects regression, see Eq. 12. While the former
ignores the unobserved household-specific term ch, the latter allows it to be cor-
related with time-averages of the observed household characteristics. We estimate
each of the two regressions with two specifications. The first specification includes
the measures of mobility requirements and diversification potential, the initial and
lagged tenure mode, and time and region dummies as explanatory variables. The
second specification adds further socio-economic control variables. The correlated
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random effects estimates further include a set of dummy variables taking the value
one if a household is not observed in a given year. These dummies control for sys-
tematic sample attrition that might be correlated with ch. The standard errors of
the corresponding average partial effects are estimated with a block bootstrap.24
[Table 6 about here.]
The partial effects estimated with the pooled probit regression ignore unobserved
heterogeneity among households and act as a reference. These effects are reported
in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6. The partial effects imply very strong inertia
in the tenure mode choice. The estimated positive effect of yh,t−1 exceeds 0.94 in
all specifications. This implies that having been a renter in the previous period
makes renting in the current period very likely. Regarding our key explanatory
variables mh,t and dh,t, the pooled probit estimates are qualitatively comparable to
the earlier estimates using the sample of recent movers. The estimated effect of
mh,t is negative and significant in both specifications, whereas the effect of dh,t is
statistically insignificant. The magnitude of mobility effect implies that a decrease
of the expected time of stay by six years—and therefore an increase in the mobility
requirement—leads to an increase of the probability of renting by between 8 to 10
percentage points.
The results from our preferred approach, which is the correlated random ef-
fects regression, are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 6. Before examining
the estimated average partial effects, we discuss the evidence on the importance of
unobserved household-specific effects for the tenure mode choice. This evidence is
24Each block consist of all observations for an household. For each set of blocks with the same
size (measured in years), we resample from the original set until the new set has as many blocks
as the original set. We repeat this procedure 200 times. This sampling procedure preserves the
total sample size as well as the pattern of unbalancedness found in the full sample. For each full
sample replication, we estimate average partial effects and use the standard deviations across the
replications as bootstrap standard errors.
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provided by the estimated standard deviation of the unobserved effect in Eq. 12,
reported in the lowest panel of columns (3) and (4). In each of the two specifica-
tions of the correlated random effects regression, the estimate of σa is substantial.
The likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that θ ≡ σ2a/(1 + σ2a) is zero is always
rejected.25 Furthermore, controlling for unobserved effects improves the fit of the
model, as evidenced by the change in the log likelihood. It follows from this evidence
that pooled probit estimates—even if socioeconomic differences between households
are considered as in Specification 2—will be biased and inconsistent.
The average partial effects estimated with Eq. 13 take unobserved heterogeneity
explicitly into account. These effects are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table
6. The estimated average partial effect of the lagged tenure mode, yh,t−1, is positive
and significant in both specifications of the correlated random effects regression.
Changing the tenure mode from owner to renter increases a household’s probability
of renting in the following year by approximately 50 to 57 percentage points. The
magnitude of the average partial effects are substantially smaller than the biased
estimates from the pooled probit regression.
The correlated random effects model strengthens the evidence for the effect of
mobility requirements on the probability of renting. The estimated average partial
effect of mh,t is negative and significant in both specifications. An decrease of the
expected time of stay by six years increases the probability of renting by 7 to 8
percentage points. Hence, even in the presence of state dependence, unobserved
heterogeneity, and several other control variables, the effect of mobility requirements
is present. However, there is no evidence on the diversification effect. Though
the estimated average partial effect of dh,t is positive in columns (3) and (4), it is
always statistically insignificant. The estimates from the panel of all households
thus confirm the earlier findings obtained for recent movers.
25Since the variance of the idiosyncratic error in the underlying latent variable model is one, θ
measures the relative importance of σ2a. If θ is zero, there is no unobserved effect and the pooled
probit and the random effect regressions are identical.
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The estimated average partial effects of the socio-economic control variables in
columns (3) and (4) in Table 6 are reasonable. Again variables associated with
mobility requirements of a household are statistically insignificant. The estimated
magnitudes of the average partial effects, however, differ from the pooled probit
estimates in columns (1) and (2) in Table 6 and those obtained for recent movers,
see Table 5. This bias can be motivated with the importance of the unobserved
household-specific effect, which is ignored in the latter regressions.
6 Conclusion
From a risk perspective, owning appears more attractive than renting since it shields
households from regional rent volatility. Recent contributions to the literature, how-
ever, have pointed out two potential risk-limiting effects of renting: a mobility effect
and a diversification effect. Both effects come into focus when the tenure mode choice
is viewed conditional on a household’s human capital. The mobility effect should
matter for households faced with substantial mobility requirements. For them, rent-
ing may be the more attractive tenure mode as it avoids the resale price risk and
high transaction cost owners face if they change residence. The diversification effect
should matter for households whose human capital is vested in a profession closely
related to the local economy. For such households, local rent fluctuations tend to
match and counterbalance professional income fluctuations and smooth non-housing
consumption.
This paper presents an empirical test of both human capital related effects on the
tenure mode choice of German households. The first part of our analysis concerns the
measurement of both effects. Our measure of mobility requirements—the estimated
expected time of stay—shows substantial variation across households. Our measure
of the diversification potential reflects the co-movement of profession-specific incomes
and region-specific rents. Moreover, variation in this measure across profession-
region cells is considerable.
31
The second part of our analysis concerns testing if these measures can explain
observed tenure mode choices. Our evidence comes from two sets of estimates, one
for households who have recently moved and two for an unbalanced panel of all
households. Evidence on the mobility effect is unambiguous: a shorter expected
time of stay increases the propensity to rent. This holds even after controlling for
state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity in a dynamic panel probit model
estimated from the sample of all households. The presence of a diversification effect,
on the other hand, cannot be found in our data. According to theory, the probability
of renting should increase with our measure of this effect. The estimated effect,
however, is indistinguishable from zero in all of our empirical specifications.
The empirical findings of our study are particulary interesting with respect to
a household’s risk management opportunities. A well-functioning private rental
market—as in Germany—allows households to separate housing consumption from
housing investment and thus provides valuable flexibility. This is important for
households with high mobility requirements. The results of our study indicate
that these households exploit the lower effective cost of renting. Moreover, from
a theoretical perspective, renting can provide further benefits by allowing smooth-
ing non-housing consumption. The empirical results of our study, however, provide
no evidence that households exploit this diversification potential.
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A Appendix
A.1 Cluster analysis
Our cluster analysis uses the observed transitions between occupation-industry groups
to delineate professions. Let i denote a occupation-industry group and pij the prob-
ability of an individual belonging to this group conditional on being a member of
group j in the previous period. The transition probability is
pij =
∑
t∈T Ni,t|j,t−1∑
t∈T Ni,t
, (A1)
where Ni,t|j,t−1 is the number of individuals in group i in period t conditional on
being in group j in period t − 1. Ni,t denotes the total number of individuals in
group i in period t.
To estimate transition probabilities between occupation-industry groups, we use
information on individuals in the full sample that are in employment and have
been in the GSOEP for at least two years. Each individual falls into one of 9
ISCO-88 1-digit occupations and one of 14 NACE Rev.1 1-digit industries. This
leads to 126 occupation-industry groups, of which two have no observations in our
sample. The estimated transition probabilities provide the data with which we select
professions. We use a K-Medians cluster algorithm that starts from a given partition
of the groups and proceeds by exchanging groups between clusters so that all groups
within a cluster are closest to the cluster’s centroid. The algorithm converges when
occupation-industry groups are no longer exchanged between profession groups. We
run the cluster analysis with different initial profession groupings found by a first
step agglomerative cluster algorithm. In most case, the cluster analysis leads to 14
profession groups.
[Table A1 about here.]
Table A1 presents the estimated transition matrix for the 14 professions. The
professions are fairly stable. The diagonal elements of the matrix shows the tran-
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sition probabilities within professions. The lowest within transition probability is
79 percent, the highest 94 percent. The off-diagonal elements, which are the transi-
tion probabilities between professions, are almost always lower than 3 percent. The
lowest between transition probability is 0 percent and the highest about 10 percent.
A.2 Survival analysis
We estimate the coefficients in Eq. 4 using a linear regression for censored data
ln (τh) = x(τh)β + εh , (A2)
where τh is the time since household h moved into the current dwelling. A spell is
completed if the household moves to a new residence or disbands. Disbandment is
the result of emigration or death. Incomplete spells are defined to be right-censored.
The vector x(τh) collects, possibly time-varying, household characteristics at time
τh, as well as full set of profession, region, and time dummies. The latter take the
value one for if the household’ residence spells begins in the respective year. The
idiosyncratic error term is distributed with εh ∼ N(0, σ2).
Eq. A2 is estimated with ML, using a flow sample of residence spells from the
GSOEP. In particular, a household enters the sample if it moves to a new residence
or is newly formed between 1985–2003. We allow for multiple spells of the same
household and adjust standard errors in the estimation accordingly. In total, we
have 6,842 residence spells, of which 3,407 are completed. The remaining spells are
right-censored.
[Table A2 about here.]
Table A2 reports summary statistics of household characteristics in the spell sample.
With respect to most of their socioeconomic characteristics households in this sample
are quite similar to recent movers as summarized in column (2) of Table 1. This is
attributable to the fact that the GSOEP, on average, follows newly moved households
for only 5 years.
34
A.3 Income series
We derive the profession-specific constant-quality income series from the hedonic
repeat-measures regression
yi,t = α0 + xi,tβ + γp0Dp,i,0 + γptDp,i,t + ci + εi,t , (A3)
where yi,t is the log of the employment income of individual i in period t (t =
1984, . . . , 2004). The vector xi,t contains time-varying individual characteristics, as
well as a full set of region dummies. The binary indicator Dp,i,0 is set to one if
individual i is employed in profession p in the base period t = 1995. The binary
indicator Dp,i,t is set to one if individual i is employed in profession p in period
t 6= 1995. The profession dummies for the base period, Dp,i,0, control for the income
change of individuals who switch professions between periods. Observed and unob-
served time-constant characteristics are captured by the individual specific effect ci.
εi,t is an idiosyncratic error term.
Estimating Eq. A3 directly would lead to a biased estimator, because unob-
served characteristics captured in ci are omitted. We therefore use a fixed effects
estimator, which subtracts the individual-specific average from each observed vari-
able. This removes the observed and unobserved time-constant characteristics, ci,
from the regression equation. Estimating this modified regression with OLS leads
to an unbiased estimator for the coefficients in Eq. A3.
We use an unbalanced panel sample of the relevant 15,701 employed individu-
als in the GSOEP to estimate the coefficients. Following the literature on Mincer
wage equations we include education in years, labor force experience in years, and
labor force experience squared in xi,t. Further controls comprise age, work hours,
and duration of current employment. These variables are suggested by Shiller and
Schneider (1998) to ensure that the income index captures only the income trend
of fully employed individuals in a given profession. As economic theory does not
suggest a particular functional form for the age and work hours variable, we use the
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Box-Cox type transformation suggested in Bunke et al (1999). These functions cap-
ture non-linearities, such as the common hump-shaped age profile of income. Table
A3 presents these fixed effects estimates. The fit of the regression is reasonably good
as measured by the R2. Moreover, the estimated coefficients of the control variables
have reasonable signs and are statistically significant.
[Table A3 about here.]
We obtain profession-specific income series in two steps. First, we compute
constant-quality index series Ip,t = exp{γ̂p,t − 0.5σ̂2γp,t}. γ̂p,t is the estimated time
dummy coefficient from Eq. A3 for profession p in period t. σ̂2γp,t is the estimated
variance of the coefficient estimator, which corrects for small-sample bias. The index
series are normalized to one in the base period 1995. Second, we convert the series
into series in levels, thereby taking account for unemployment
Ypr,t = (1− up,t)Ip,tY¯pr + up,tBtIp,tY¯pr . (A4)
The median employment income Y¯pr is for profession-region cell (pr) in year 1995.
The unemployment rate up,t is estimated from the GSOEP. Bt is the OECD sum-
mary measure of unemployment benefits, which is the ratio of gross benefit enti-
tlements and gross earnings (Martin, 1996). Bt is published only on a biannual
basis and we interpolate values for non-covered years linearly. The full-employment
income Ip,tYpr,1995 and the unemployment benefit Ip,tBtYpr,1995 are weighted by the
profession-specific unemployment rate in the respective period. After deflating with
the consumer price index, we obtain the final constant-quality real income series.
A.4 Rent series
We derive the region-specific rent series from the hedonic repeat-measures regression
yi,t = α0 + xi,tβ + γr,tDr,i,t + ci + εi,t , (A5)
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where yi,t is the log rent of dwelling i in period t (t = 1984, . . . , 2004). The vector xi,t
collects time-varying characteristics of the dwelling. These include variables related
to modernization (indicators if a bathroom and central heating are present), as well
as variables related to the landlord-tenant relationship (indicators for subsidized
rental housing and different lengths of tenancy). The binary indicator Dr,i,t is set
to one if the dwelling is observed in region r and period t. Unobserved and observed
time-constant characteristics, such as size of the dwelling, type of building, and type
of urban area are captured by the dwelling-specific effect ci. εi,t is an idiosyncratic
error term.
We estimate the coefficients in Eq. A5 using an unbalanced panel sample of
9,852 rental dwellings in the GSOEP. As before, we use a fixed effects estimator,
which removes the time-constant observed and unobserved characteristics, ci, from
the regression. Table A4 reports the coefficient estimates. The fit of the regression
measured with the R2 is reasonably good. Moreover, the estimated coefficients
for the included time-varying variables have reasonable signs and are statistically
significant at the usual significance levels.
[Table A4 about here.]
We compute region-specific constant-quality rent series in two steps. First, we
compute constant-quality index series from the estimated time dummy coefficients
in Eq. A5 with Ir,t = exp{γ̂r,t − 0.5σ̂2γr,t}, where γ̂r,t is the estimated time dummy
coefficient for region r in period t. σ̂γr,t is the corresponding estimated standard
error of the coefficient estimator. This second term corrects for small sample bias.
The index series are normalized to one for our base period 1995. We then, second,
convert the index series into level series Rr,t = Îr,tR¯r,1995, where R¯r,1995 represents
the median rent level in region r for the year 1995. After deflating with the consumer
price index, we obtain the final constant-quality real rent series.
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Figure 1: Estimated survival functions for least mobile (‘Profession 4’) and most
mobile profession (‘Profession 13’). Estimated with a lognormal regression of residence
spells. Survival function S(τ |x) is evaluated at sample averages of household characteristics
at beginning of residence spell.
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Figure 2: Box plots of covariances between rent and income growth rates. Box
plots are for the 14 professions and are presented with the names describing these professions.
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Figure 3: Scatter plot of diversification potential and covariance. Shows the em-
pirical relationship between the measure of diversification potential, dpr, and the covariance
between rent and income growth rates for the 420 profession-region cells.
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Table 1: Summary statistics by household sample for the years 1985–2004. Av-
erages of variables, standard deviations of the variables are in square brackets. Employment
income is yearly income from employment of household head in real (year 2000) Euros.
Price-income ratio is the ratio of the average price of a single-family dwelling of average
quality with yearly household income. Data for regional house prices are provided by the
RDM. Diversification potential is calculated according to Eq. 7. This variable is allowed to
depend on both the profession of the household head and the spouse. Mobility requirement
is the expected remaining time of stay in years, as defined in Eq. 4.
Sub-samples
All households Recent movers Unbalanced panel
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable
Renter [0.581] [0.743] [0.531]
Continuous characteristics
Diversification potential [0.976] [0.978] [0.976]
[0.101] [0.102] [0.102]
Mobility requirement [14.245] [10.478] [16.172]
[5.701] [5.589] [5.173]
Age [43.695] [36.608] [47.867]
[11.375] [10.335] [9.943]
Education [11.447] [11.721] [11.285]
[2.677] [2.851] [2.687]
Household Size [2.902] [2.601] [3.035]
[1.386] [1.294] [1.409]
Employment income (000) [25.061] [23.219] [26.015]
[19.366] [18.193] [19.951]
House price/Hh. income [12.071] [13.166] [11.508]
[13.325] [8.645] [9.055]
Discrete characteristics
Female 0.242 0.370 0.161
Children 0.531 0.423 0.569
Married 0.705 0.536 0.771
No assets 0.101 0.146 0.097
Foreigner 0.237 0.236 0.157
Observations 52,413 4,254 36,625
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Table 2: Clustering of industries and occupations into professions. Occupations
are the 9 main occupations according to ISCO-88 classification, which comprises the follow-
ing occupations: ISCO 1 Legislators, senior officials, and managers, ISCO 2 Professionals,
ISCO 3 Technicians and associate professionals, ISCO 4 Clerks, ISCO 5 Service workers and
shop and market sales workers, ISCO 6 Skilled agricultural and fishery worker, ISCO 7 Craft
and related trades workers, ISCO 8 Plant and machine operators and assemblers, ISCO 9
Elementary occupations. Industries are the 14 main sectors according to NACE, Rev. 1.1
classification, which comprises the following sectors: NACE A Agriculture, hunting, and
forestry, NACE C Mining and quarrying, NACE D Manufacturing, NACE E Electricity, gas
and water supply, NACE F Construction, NACE G Wholesale and retail trade, NACE H
Hotels and restaurants, NACE I Transport, storage and communication, NACE J Financial
intermediation, NACE K Real estate, renting and business activities, NACE L Public ad-
ministration and defence, NACE M Education, NACE N Health and social work, NACE O
Other community, social and personal service activities. Sectors according to NACE B, and
NACE P, and NACE Q are excluded.
Profession group (Occupation/Industry)
1: Management/Production, trade 08: All occupations/Health, social work
2: Management/Public, private 09: Manual/Production, service
3: Management/Public 10: Elementary/Public, private
4: All occupations/Natural resources 11: Service work/Service
5: All occupations/Energy, utilities 12: Service work/Production
6: All occupations/Hotel,restaurants 13: All occupations/Agricultural
7: All occupations/Transport, communication 14: All occupations/Financial
ISCO-88
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
NACE A 13 2 2 2 13 13 9 13 13
NACE C 4 4 4 4 12 - 4 4 4
NACE D 1 1 1 1 12 13 9 9 9
NACE E 5 5 5 5 12 - 5 5 5
NACE F 1 2 1 1 12 13 9 9 9
NACE G 1 1 1 1 12 13 9 9 10
NACE H 6 6 6 6 6 6 9 9 6
NACE I 7 7 7 7 7 13 7 7 7
NACE J 14 14 14 14 11 14 14 14 10
NACE K 1 3 1 1 11 13 9 10 10
NACE L 2 2 2 2 11 13 9 10 10
NACE M 3 3 3 3 11 13 9 10 10
NACE N 8 3 8 8 8 8 9 8 10
NACE O 3 3 3 3 11 13 9 9 10
46
Table 3: Lognormal regression of residence spells. Table reports ML estimates
of lognormal regression of residence spells, see Eq. A2. Standard errors are robust towards
serial correlation. LR-Statistic reports χ2-statistic for the null hypothesis that all coefficients
in Eq. A2 are jointly zero. Wald-Statistic reports χ2-statistic for the null hypothesis that
reported coefficients on profession dummies are jointly zero. *** significant at 1%-level **
significant at 5%-level * significant at 10%-level.
Dependent variable: Log residence duration
Employment income 0.003∗∗∗ [0.001]
No assets -0.234∗∗∗ [0.043]
House price/Hh. income -0.003∗∗ [0.001]
Age 0.026∗∗∗ [0.002]
Education -0.019∗∗∗ [0.009]
Female -0.032 [0.038]
Household size 0.138∗∗∗ [0.022]
Children -0.096 [0.059]
Married 0.433∗∗∗ [0.044]
Foreigner -0.077∗ [0.043]
Unemployed -0.118∗ [0.071]
Profession1 0.295∗∗∗ [0.082]
Profession2 0.252∗∗ [0.101]
Profession3 0.282∗∗∗ [0.094]
Profession4 -0.099 [0.201]
Profession5 0.072 [0.152]
Profession7 0.299∗∗∗ [0.098]
Profession8 0.246∗∗∗ [0.091]
Profession9 0.277∗∗∗ [0.080]
Profession10 0.252∗∗ [0.115]
Profession11 0.311∗∗ [0.134]
Profession12 0.346∗∗∗ [0.114]
Profession13 0.441∗∗∗ [0.168]
Profession14 0.303∗∗∗ [0.104]
Region dummies Yes
Time dummies Yes
σ̂ε 1.007 [0.012]
LR-Statistics 1076.43∗∗∗ Obs. 29,369
Wald-Statistics 23.49∗∗∗ Log Lik. -6,449
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Table 4: Summary statistics of income and rent. Variables are at the level of
profession-region cells. Standard errors are in square brackets. Rent growth and income
growth are measured with the constant-quality rent and income index series, respectively.
Median monthly gross rent and income come from the 1995 GSOEP wave, converted into
year 2000 Euros.
Professions Regions
1985–2004 1985–2004 1995
Profession-specific real income growth
Avg. real income growth [0.012]
[0.036]
S.d. of real income growth [0.034]
[0.013]
Real median income [2223.42]
[245.80]
Region-specific real rent growth
Avg. Real rent growth [0.014]
[0.041]
S.d. of real rent growth [0.039]
[0.017]
Real median rent [331.70]
[39.212]
Observations 280 600 30
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Table 5: Partial effects from bivariate probit model for recent movers. Table
reports joint ML estimates of Eqs. 8 and 9. Partial effects (PE) are evaluated at sample
averages of explanatory variables. Bootstrap standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Number of bootstrap replications is 200. LR-Statistic reports χ2-statistic for the null hy-
pothesis that all coefficients in Eq. 8 are jointly zero. *** significant at 1%-level ** significant
at 5%-level * significant at 10%-level.
Specification (1) (2)
Mover Renter Mover Renter
(Coef.) (PE) (Coef.) (PE)
mh,t -0.015
∗∗∗ -0.003
[0.005] [0.002]
dh,t -0.136 0.012
[0.095] [0.061]
Employment income -0.001 -0.001 -0.001∗∗
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000]
No assets 0.184∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
[0.031] [0.030] [0.020]
House price/Hh. income -0.002∗ -0.003∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Age -0.027∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.002
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Education 0.007 0.009∗∗ -0.004∗∗
[0.005] [0.005] [0.002]
Female -0.004 0.001 0.000
[0.024] [0.005] [0.010]
Household size -0.047∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗
[0.011] [0.011] [0.008]
Children -0.032 -0.023 -0.010
[0.035] [0.034] [0.015]
Married -0.219∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗
[0.027] [0.025] [0.024]
Foreigner 0.130∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
[0.026] [0.025] [0.024]
Increase in Hh. size 0.643∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗
[0.033] [0.032]
Decrease in Hh. size 0.338∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗
[0.040] [0.039]
Increase in children -0.196∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗
[0.062] [0.062]
Decrease in children 0.046 0.040
[0.062] [0.061]
Become married 0.436∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗
[0.050] [0.045]
Become divorced 0.080 0.087
[0.076] [0.077]
Become employed 0.246∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗
[0.040] [0040.]
Become unemployed 0.152∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
[0.059] [0.037]
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Profession dummies Yes No Yes No
ρ -0.302∗∗∗ -0.457∗∗∗
LR-Statistic 198.74∗∗∗ 776.43∗∗∗
Log Likelihood -15,318 -15,029
Observations 52,413 4,254 52,413 4,254
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Table 6: Partial effects and average partial effects from dynamic panel probit
regressions. Table reports partial effects from pooled probit regressions, using Eq. 10
and assuming independent ch, and average partial effects from correlated random effects
regressions, Eqs. 12 and 13. Partial effects are calculated at sample averages of explanatory
variables. Effects for yh,0 is not reported. Bootstrap standard errors are reported in paren-
thesis. Number of bootstrap replications is 200. χ¯2-Statistic is for likelihood ratio test of
the null hypothesis that θ = σ2a/(σ
2
a+1) is zero. LR-Statistic reports χ
2-statistic for the null
hypothesis that all coefficients in Eqs. 10 and 12 are jointly zero. *** significant at 1%-level
** significant at 5%-level * significant at 10%-level.
Binary dependent variable: Household is renter
Pooled probit Correlated RE
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
yh,t−1 0.946∗∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.003] [0.040] [0.037]
mh,t -0.013
∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗
[0.001] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004]
dh,t -0.138 -0.008 0.031 0.043
[0.100] [0.100] [0.125] [0.137]
Employment income 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
No assets 0.064∗∗ 0.003
[0.027] [0.023]
House price/Hh. income 0.006∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗
[0.001] [0.001]
Age 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001
[0.001] [0.002]
Education -0.015∗∗∗ -0.010
[0.003] [0.007]
Female -0.028 -0.029
[0.020] [0.022]
Household size 0.015 -0.016
[0.010] [0.011]
Children -0.037∗ 0.005
[0.020] [0.022]
Married -0.076∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗
[0.024] [0.029]
Foreigner 0.180∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
[0.017] [0.020]
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Missing dummies No No Yes Yes
σ̂a 1.216 0.987
χ¯2-Statistic 220.190∗∗∗ 161.24∗∗∗
LR-Statistic 42,300∗∗∗ 9,458∗∗∗ 42,685∗∗∗ 9,807∗∗∗
Log Likelihood -4,165 -3,908 -3,973 -3,733
Observations 36,625 36,625 36,625 36,625
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Table A2: Summary statistics for residence spells, 1985–2004. Number of obser-
vations is 29,369 which comprise 6,842 spells. Maximal length of spell covers censored and
uncensored spells. Age is age of household head at the beginning of the spell. Employment
income is yearly income from employment of household head in real (year 2000) Euros.
Price-income ratio is the ratio of the average price of a single-family dwelling of average
quality with yearly household income. Data for regional house prices are provided by the
RDM.
Mean Median Std. Dev.
Dependent variable
Maximal length of spell 4.856 3.000 4.070
Continuous characteristics
Age 34.078 32.000 9.208
Education 11.723 11.000 2.788
Household Size 2.737 3.000 1.386
Employment income (000) 27.456 25.478 17.823
House price/Hh. income 12.402 10.221 9.875
Discrete characteristics
Female 0.305
Children 0.467
Married 0.598
No assets 0.109
Unemployed 0.050
Foreigner 0.239
Table A3: Hedonic repeat-measures income regression. Table reports fixed effects
estimates of Eq. A3. Time dummies, and region dummies are not reported. T (·) is the
Box-Cox type transformation function suggested by Bunke et al (1999). Standard errors are
calculated with the robust covariance estimator suggested by Arellano (1987). *** significant
at 1%-level ** significant at 5%-level * significant at 10%-level.
Dependent variable: Log employment income
T (Age) 16.699∗∗∗ [0.384]
T (Age)2 -22.381∗∗∗ [0.690]
Education 0.060∗∗∗ [0.002]
Experience 0.048∗∗∗ [0.002]
Experience2 -0.001∗∗∗ [0.000]
T (Workhours) -114.697∗∗∗ [7.866]
T (Workhours)2 142.569∗∗∗ [8.597]
Duration of employment 0.003∗∗∗ [0.000]
Observations 107,073 R2 0.614
Workers 15,701 σ̂c 0.429
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Table A4: Hedonic repeat-measures rent regression. Table reports fixed effects
estimates of Eq. A5. Time dummies are not reported. Standard errors are calculated with
the robust covariance estimator suggested by Arellano (1987). *** significant at 1%-level **
significant at 5%-level * significant at 10%-level.
Dependent variable: Log rent
No bathroom -0.093∗∗∗ [0.012]
No central heating -0.059∗∗∗ [0.007]
Subsidized housing -0.023∗∗∗ [0.004]
1-5 yrs. of occup. -0.015∗∗∗ [0.005]
6-10 yrs. of occup. -0.018∗∗∗ [0.006]
11-15 yrs. of occup. -0.016∗∗ [0.007]
16-20 yrs. of occup. -0.014 [0.010]
21> yrs. of occup. -0.006 [0.012]
Observations 53,544 R2 0.320
Dwellings 9,852 σ̂c 0.423
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